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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: THE
LINKS BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND
THE SUPREME COURT’S 2011 TERM
Peter J. Woolley* & Bruce G. Peabody**
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, scholars have begun to explore the role
private citizens play in shaping constitutional law. Some of these research
efforts engage normative questions, while others construct descriptive,
historical, and positive accounts of this phenomenon.1 Despite this
increased interest in “popular constitutionalism,” few have sought to
identify and measure the precise form and political impact of this variant of
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation. Stated differently, not much
empirical work has defined popular constitutionalism’s specific content and
parameters.

* Peter J. Woolley, Professor of Comparative Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University.
Professor Woolley is also co-founder and executive director (2001–2012) of PublicMind,
Fairleigh Dickinson University’s independent survey research group.
** Bruce Peabody, Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University.
1. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (1996) (examining the
role of various actors in interpreting the Constitution in the context of the abortion debate);
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (examining the
impact of public opinion on constitutional change); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (positing that
customary constitutionalism is only achieved when the Constitution reflects the will of the
people); RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO (1994) (examining the flaws of anti-populist decision making); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing against constitutional
judicial review); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006) (examining some of the
obstacles for popular constitutionalism in light of the rule of recognition (i.e., the rule for
identifying law that is accepted as the ultimate rule by officials in the legal system)); Larry
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (arguing that
social movements influence constitutional understanding); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century,
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (observing that popular constitutional movements have
helped advance racial equality and gay rights); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The
Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986) (examining who
should be the ultimate constitutional interpreter).
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We attempt to address some of this deficiency in this essay (and in other
work) by measuring and marking the constitutional attitudes of members of
the public through scientific surveys. We use the shorthand “constitutional
thinking” to denote our interest in obtaining measurements of the public’s
views on constitutional issues, especially in contexts where the public is
likely to articulate a distinctive voice, rather than simply mimicking the
pronouncements of courts and judges.
Over the Supreme Court’s past two terms, the Fairleigh Dickinson
University poll, PublicMind, has asked voters their legal opinions about
cases being heard by the high court, testing the proposition that members of
the public not only can be, but actually are, capable constitutional thinkers.
This national polling has provided unique measures of public opinion on a
number of substantive constitutional matters before the Court. These
issues, while notable to scholars and the most attentive Court watchers,
were neither familiar to the public nor widely discussed in popular media.
Indeed, while polling has provided snapshots and trend lines of the
public’s views over many decades on a number of high profile decision
areas,2 rarely do other obscure, but important, cases or topics receive
similar treatment. Thus, we have a great deal of data on public attitudes
towards gun control, abortion, affirmative action, and now, health insurance
reform,3 but minimal knowledge of what the public thinks about the scores
of other important topics and controversies before the Court each term.
With this “blind spot” in mind, this essay examines five important cases
from the 2011 Term with which the public are unfamiliar and compares
these results with the results from our first poll last year, when we also
polled public attitudes regarding several obscure cases prior to the Court
issuing its decisions.
During the 2010 Term, we polled four cases to help us plumb the popular
constitutionalism phenomenon.4 We were genuinely surprised by the
results and encouraged to gather additional data and search for patterns.
Thus, during the 2011 Term, we offered American voters the opportunity to
weigh in on six constitutional issues pending before the Court. The first

2. See generally PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel
Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008).
3. Id. For a discussion of recent polling on health care, see Bruce G. Peabody & Peter
J. Woolley, The Public’s Constitutional Thinking and the Fate of Health Care Reform:
PPACA As Case Study, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 26 (2012),
fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/volume/81/26_Peabody.pdf.
4. See Bruce G. Peabody & Peter J. Woolley, Res Publica: Public Opinion,
Constitutional Law, and the Supreme Court’s 2010 Term, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE
10, 16–20 (2011), http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/volume/80/10_Peabody.pdf
[hereinafter Peabody & Woolley, Res Republica] (discussing results from the 2010 term);
Peter J. Woolley & Bruce G. Peabody, Polls, the Public, and Popular Perspectives on
Constitutional Issues, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 22, 24–25 (2011), http://
fordhamlawreview.org/assets/resgestae/volume/80/22_Woolley.pdf (explaining the methods
and rationale for our polling).
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issue, from United States v. Jones,5 asked whether police must have a
proper warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle.6 The
second, from Lafler v. Cooper,7 examined the limits of the right to counsel,
asking whether defendants had a right to correct advice about a plea
bargain.8 This question was distinct from that posed in our third case,
Missouri v. Frye,9 which probed whether defendants must be informed of a
plea offer.10 Fourth, we asked the public to consider Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission11 and whether there is a “ministerial exception” to the First
Amendment such that church employees are not covered by the same labor
protections as employees of other organizations.12 The fifth issue, from
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,13 concerned whether prison
guards may strip search prisoners without reasonable suspicion, regardless
of a prisoner’s offense.14 Finally, we asked respondents to consider the
divisive issue posed in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius,15 concerning the propriety of a health insurance mandate.16
Because of its greater press coverage and awareness by the public, as well
as its highly partisan context, we treat polling on the Florida case as a
separate query from the other five cases and therefore analyze in a separate
essay.17

5. No. 10-1259 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf.
6. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, High Court Agrees with
Public in US v Jones: Electronic Tails Need a Warrant 2–4 (Jan. 23, 2012), available at
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/tailing/ [hereinafter GPS Monitoring Press Release].
7. No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-209.pdf.
8. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Like US Supreme Court, US
Voters Split on Bad Legal Advice 3–6 (Mar. 22, 2012), available at
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/badadvice/ [hereinafter Legal Advice Press Release].
9. No. 10-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf.
10. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3–6.
11. No. 10-553 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf.
12. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, In Contrast to High Court,
US Voters Split on Freedom of Churches to Hire and Fire 2–4 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/hosanna/ [hereinafter Ministerial Exception Press Release].
13. No. 10-945 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-945.pdf.
14. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Nation Sides with New
Jersey Motorist Against Court, Automatic Strip Searches 2–4 (Apr. 2, 2012), available at
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/strip/ [hereinafter Strip Searches Press Release].
15. No. 11-393 (U.S. June 28, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf.
16. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Health Insurance: Can
They Or Can’t They? 2–5 (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/
2012/require/ [hereinafter Health Insurance Press Release].
17. For our analysis of the Sebelius decision, see Peabody & Woolley, supra note 3.
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I. THE ENDLESS WAR ON ERROR: AN INTRODUCTION TO
OUR POLLING TECHNIQUES
The polling that underlies this research was based on a national,
randomly selected sample of registered voters. The sample for the 2011
Term comprised 855 voters recruited and interviewed by telephone,
including both landline and cell phones.18 Professionals conducted the
interviews using a script provided to them.19 The margin of error for our
sample of 855 randomly selected respondents is +/- 3.5 percentage points at
the 95 percent level of confidence—meaning that nineteen of twenty runs of
the experiment will produce variations in the “topline” (aggregate) results
of just a few points.20
Consistent with our previous effort in the Supreme Court’s 2010 Term,
two main criteria informed our choice of cases. First, we selected cases
whose core issues would be of sufficient interest to voters that they would
remain engaged. Practically speaking, when constructing a questionnaire
one must remember that telephone interviews and human beings have finite,
if somewhat variable, limitations. Even under the best conditions, a poll
entails a stranger telephoning in the evening, often at a respondent’s home,
and asking him or her to sacrifice time immediately, generally with no
reward other than a perceived obligation of civic duty. Having accepted the
initial request, respondents must still reply to questions about their views on
public affairs, carrying on for about ten minutes on a variety of topics.
To minimize nonattitudes, nonresponses, question refusals, and interview
break-offs, it is good practice not to try respondents’ patience and to be
clear, swift, and mercifully short. That said, given the nature of our
polling—which consisted of a series of questions about sometimes related
but substantively distinct areas—by the time anyone was asked about, say,
the constitutional tradeoff of law enforcement needs and privacy interests in
18. The telephone eliminates the possibility of the interviewer using physical signs or
gestures to get his or her point across. Questions were presented in a neutral manner, as
follows: “Some people argue . . . . Other people argue . . . . Which comes closer to your
view?” See, e.g., Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 14, at 3. Nevertheless, a
telephone interview cannot eliminate all external influences, as it is possible that people at
home might have distractions that affect their responses. Televisions, computer games,
children, spouses, pets, and grumbling stomachs all may distract and detract from the
respondent’s concentration.
19. For the exact question wording and order, see 2012 Releases Year to Date,
PUBLICMIND POLL, http://publicmind.fdu.edu/prioryears/2012.html (last updated Sept. 17,
2012).
20. The margin of error for subgroups is larger and varies by the size of that subgroup.
Survey results are also subject to nonsampling error. This kind of error cannot be measured
and arises from a number of factors including, but not limited to, nonresponse (eligible
individuals who refuse to be interviewed), question wording, question order, and variations
among interviewers. The interviews were conducted by Opinion America of Cedar Knolls,
New Jersey, from November 29, 2011, through December 5, 2011. Professionally trained
interviewers utilized a computer assisted telephone interviewing system. The total combined
sample, which included both land-lines and cell phones, was mathematically weighted to
match known demographics of age, race, and gender among the voting population. See id.,
for press releases on polling results that contain details of the sample population.
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United States v. Jones, he would already have answered a gauntlet of
questions from presidential candidate preferences and the direction of the
country to his attitude toward betting on professional sports.21
The second criterion we used in our selection was that the core issue in
the case had to be amenable to polling; that is, not so complex that it would
be impossible to represent a core issue clearly and quickly to our polled
public. Again, the issue would be presented on the telephone to a stranger
and would be presented to as wide a variety of respondents as there are
voters. We deemed both of these factors as important constraints on polling
individuals on complex constitutional issues.22
Beyond these basic selection criteria, we tried to follow “best practices”
to achieve the most useful polling results. One such practice is to balance
each question to the extent possible. Respondents should not get any
indication that one answer is more desirable to the interviewer, or to the
question writers, than another. The questions should signal parity in the
proffered choices, in the following manner: “Some people argue that . . .
and other people argue that . . . .” The questions should invite agreement
with any possibility: “Which comes closer to your view?” Meanwhile, the
answer categories should be parallel, containing language that signals parity
and equal validity. For instance, in our polling on Hosanna-Tabor we
phrased the conflict as follows: “To protect religious freedom, churches
have . . .” and, “To protect individual rights, churches have . . . .”23
Moreover, the answers are always read in random order so that no one
answer category is always read first or last.24
21. For exact question wording and order of questions preceding the questions on
pending Supreme Court decisions, see Press Release, Farleigh Dickinson Univ.’s
PublicMind, Gingrich is New Fave, Voters Approve of Iraq Withdrawal, President Beats All
Comers (Dec. 7, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/newfave/, and Press Release,
Farleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Too Soon to Think about Vice Presidential
Candidates? For some . . . but Not Others (Dec. 14, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/
toosoon/.
22. It must also be remembered that most voters are neither lawyers nor Court watchers
and may also not be informed on the topics of the day nor accustomed to talking about
public affairs. Furthermore, they may not only be inattentive to the Court but also relatively
uneducated. Indeed, when it comes to cases on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court, voters
of many backgrounds are untutored laypersons. We did not poll on many cases of interest to
us, or of potential interest to the public, because we were unable to construct questions that
were easily accessible to the general public.
23. Ministerial Exception Press Release, supra note 12, at 2.
24. We followed other best practices, obvious but too important to ignore. First, we did
not ask one question about a case. To keep the interview moving and the respondent
engaged, we asked at least two questions. The first question served the main purpose of
simply introducing the topic. For example, to begin the four question series on Lafler, we
asked, “Are you aware or not aware that the U.S. Constitution gives people the right to a
lawyer in criminal cases?” Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 4. We were not
especially interested in the answer to this question (92 percent said they were aware), but we
were keenly interested in establishing the topic, helping our respondents to make a cognitive
shift from one set of queries to another, more pointed set about lawyers representing clients
in the context of plea bargaining. Id. at 3. For other topics, we began by asking respondents
whether they had ever heard about a particular case by surfacing some of its key identifying
or orienting features. For example, with Jones we introduced the subject by saying: “In one
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Clearly, the questions we put to voters were not as rich in terms of their
fact patterns, legal complexity, or overall context as the arguments
submitted to the Court. The voters in our sample received only the most
basic and relevant background—indeed, the equivalent of index cards for
the petitioner and respondent in each case. Nevertheless, we contend that
this information was thoughtful and free of jargon, drawing choices in clear
contrast.
II. CASES AND RESULTS: LAWYERS, DRUGS, AND MINISTERS
Our cases from 2011 Term included two search and seizure cases (United
States v. Jones and Florence v. Board of Freeholders), two intertwined
cases involving the right to counsel (Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye),
and a First Amendment dispute involving the contours of the “ministerial
exception” to employment discrimination laws (Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC).
The cases addressed very different questions of civil liberties and civil
rights and, like our study of the 2010 Term, brought up issues with
implications for both criminal justice and religious accommodation.
A. United States v. Jones: Popular Constitutionalism and Fourth
Amendment Limits on Technology
In Jones, the Court considered whether attaching a GPS device to a
vehicle and then using that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements for
twenty-eight days constituted an unreasonable search, for which a warrant
is required under the Fourth Amendment.25 The case involved suspected
drug dealer Antoine Jones, who police tracked for almost a month as he
rode around conducting business in his wife’s car.26 Jones, a nightclub
operator, was subsequently convicted and received a life sentence for his
part in a drug trafficking scheme.27 However, his lawyers appealed on
grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by dint of a
warrantless search.28 To obtain evidence against him, police had installed
the GPS tracking device without a valid warrant, as the date of a previously
obtained warrant had expired and the police installed the device outside the
jurisdiction in which it was valid.29 The Court was faced with the question
of whether attaching a GPS device and following the car’s movements
constituted a “search” for which a valid warrant was even required?30
case, the question is whether police need a warrant—like a search warrant—in order to put a
GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car.” GPS Monitoring Press Release, supra note 6, at 2.
Then the interviewer immediately asked, “Have you heard or read about this case . . . ?” Id.
This practice allowed us to introduce the topic, keep the respondent attentive, and test our
sense about whether the case indeed had a low public profile.
25. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf.
26. No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1–2.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1–2.
30. See generally Brief for Respondent, Jones, No. 10-1259, 2011 WL 4479076.
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Despite the complexity of cases involving the intersection of privacy
expectations and technology, this question was sufficiently direct to set
before the American voter.
For this case, we offered two possible arguments and asked people which
came closer to their view. On the one hand, we said, “[O]nce you drive
your car, your movements are public anyway. Using a tracking device just
saves police the expense and difficulty of following the car with
detectives.”31 On the other hand, we said, “[T]he car is private property.
Police need permission from the owner, or from a judge, to put a tracking
device on personal property.”32
Surprisingly, in this instance (and others), only a small percentage could
not make up their minds. Just 6 percent said they did not know or had
mixed views about this basic choice.33 Three-quarters (73%) sided with the
position advocated by respondent Jones and identified the government’s use
of GPS monitoring as a Fourth Amendment search.34 Thus, voters
concluded that police should be required to obtain a proper warrant before
putting a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle. Only 22 percent thought
convenience to the police, savings to taxpayers, or law enforcement’s need
to track the car were values that should prevail.35 Indeed, the wide
consensus against warrantless use of GPS tracking technology was the most
lopsided result of the five cases polled.
In light of the Court’s subsequent ruling in favor of Jones, it is also worth
noting that the public’s agreement crossed generations, parties, and races.
Similarly high percentages of Republicans (67%), independents (68%), and
Democrats (78%) agreed that a warrant was needed.36 Likewise, those
under thirty years of age agreed (74%) with those over sixty years of age
(66%).37 Non-whites (80%) and whites (70%) both concluded placing the
GPS device constituted an unconstitutional search.38
We note that the polled public did not know that the D.C. Circuit had
already thrown out Jones’s conviction on the grounds that GPS tracking
violated his Fourth Amendment freedom from “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”39 Furthermore, it is likely that few of the respondents ever
learned of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision, issued only weeks
after our poll, to affirm that a proper warrant must be obtained when using a
GPS device to track the movements of a suspected criminal over a lengthy

31. GPS Monitoring Press Release, supra note 6, at 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012).
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period.40 With respect to the basic ruling in the case, the Court and the
public were in accord.
The result suggests that the public and the Court are similarly cautious
about the implications for privacy in the brave new age of GPS. As noted,
the public had little trouble deciding the case, with three quarters in
agreement with the respondent Jones and just 6 percent reporting that they
were not sure how to resolve the conflict.41 The Court, meanwhile, was not
only unanimous but also warned broadly about governmental scrutiny of
citizens. “Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms,” wrote Justice Sotomayor,
concurring with Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.42 Justice Sotomayor
continued, “[T]he Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”43
Arguably, the Court’s 9–0 opinion in favor of Jones masked considerable
division among the Justices about the proper legal reasoning for that
outcome. For five Justices—the Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas—the legal analysis turned on the
government’s installation of the GPS tracking device on the car, a Fourth
Amendment invasion of privacy because police “physically occupied
private property.”44 For the remaining Justices—Justices Alito, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan—the physical trespass onto Jones’s property (in this
case, his wife’s car) was less important than the government’s lengthy
monitoring of the respondent.45
These distinctions partially reflect the Justices’ concerns about how to
apply this case as precedent in the future to other technologies and other
episodes of law enforcement monitoring. We would not be surprised if, in
teasing out some of these other scenarios and issues, we uncovered greater
diversity in the views of the polled public as well. Our core conclusion
remains the same: on the basic and specific legal issue posed in the Jones
case, we find a great deal of overlap between the Court’s judgment and that
of the public.
For our purposes, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in the case may be
the most interesting in signaling the essential link between the Court’s work
and public opinion. Alito acknowledged that changing public opinion has a
role in determining what is a reasonable expectation of privacy and what is

40. See Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12.
41. The result is also consistent with the many polls summarized by EPIC, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, showing that the public is willing to make certain tradeoffs on
privacy for national security purposes; absent national security concerns, however, the public
insists on privacy protections from new, privacy threatening technologies. See Public
Opinion on Privacy, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
We thank Matthew Sundquist for directing us to this point.
42. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
45. Id. at 12–14 (Alito, J., concurring).
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an unreasonable, unconstitutional search.46 He further observed that
“[d]ramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular
expectations [of privacy] are in flux.”47 Accordingly, these developments
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense
of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even
if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new
technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this
development as inevitable.48

Clearly, Justice Alito’s remarks underscore the vital, unavoidable, and
reciprocal relationship between the public’s vision of constitutional values
(such as privacy) and the way in which courts and other public officials try
to give shape to our constitutional law.
B. Florence v. Board of Freeholders: Popular Constitutionalism and
Strip Searching Prisoners
Florence was our second case involving criminal procedure and civil
liberties.49 In this case, state troopers in Burlington County, New Jersey,
ran a license plate check and stopped Albert Florence, an African
American,50 as he was driving with his wife.51 He was arrested on a bench
warrant issued in Essex County, New Jersey, for failure to pay a court
fine.52 He had, in fact, paid the fine53 and even carried papers
demonstrating his good legal standing.54 During the stop, his wife
produced this seemingly exonerative record to no avail.55 Thus began a
week long ordeal in which Florence was strip searched twice: first at the
Burlington County jail and then at the Essex County jail where he had been
transferred to appear before a magistrate.56 The judge quickly determined
that Florence was not wanted and ordered the defendant released.57
Nevertheless, Florence’s post-arrest treatment raised the question of
whether it was reasonable to strip search defendants automatically even for
46. Id. at 5–7.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id.
49. Florence v. Board of Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-945.pdf.
50. We mention the race of the petitioner because it is noted in the Supreme Court briefs
for the case and in light of New Jersey law enforcement’s recent, controversial history of
“racial profiling.” See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of New Jersey Files Turnpike
Racial Profiling Lawsuit (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/aclu-new-jersey-files-turnpike-racial-profiling-lawsuit.
51. Florence, No. 10-945, slip op. at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Florence, No. 10-945, 2011 WL 2508902, at *3 (“Petitioner
kept with him a copy of the official document certifying that [he had paid the fine].”).
55. Id.
56. Florence, No. 10-945, slip op. at 2–3.
57. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 54, at 6–7.
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minor offenses absent suspicion that the suspect was carrying weapons or
drugs.
In order to surface the core constitutional question at hand in Florence,
we asked our national sample of voters whether “prison officials can
automatically strip search any person admitted to a jail, even if it is for a
minor offense” or “prison officials need to have a reasonable suspicion
before they strip search any person admitted to a jail, especially if it is for a
minor offense like failing to pay a traffic ticket.”58
More than four of five voters (82%) said they had never heard of the
case, yet just 4 percent subsequently reported they were unsure or had a
mixed opinion in the case.59 Notwithstanding their unfamiliarity with the
case, the public was ready to weigh in on the legal controversy. Two-thirds
(65%) said the same search procedure should not apply to everyone
regardless of the nature of their offense.60 Only 31 percent said that prison
officials may automatically strip search everyone, a two-to-one margin in
favor of the petitioner’s argument (which, of course, they had never heard
before).61
The public’s untutored opinion mirrored the written law of New Jersey
and of Burlington County where Florence was first strip searched.62 That
law prohibits strip searches of prisoners at intake generally unless there is
reasonable suspicion that a weapon, drugs, or other contraband may be
found.63 In fact, the jail recorded and subsequently contended that Florence
was not strip searched but only visually observed at arms’ length with his
clothes off while he lifted his arms, rotated, squatted, and lifted his testes.64
Justice Kennedy noted, however, that “[t]he opinions in earlier proceedings,
the briefs on file, and some cases of this Court refer to a ‘strip search.’”65
Indeed, “[t]he term is imprecise.”66
The Court ruled 5–4 against the petitioner and in favor of allowing
routine searches of anyone in the general prison population.67 This opinion
was at odds with the public’s judgment.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy cited the overriding need for
safety and security in any detention center; although people arrested for
minor offences are often among the detainee population, maintaining
security while drawing innumerable distinctions within this group would

58. Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 14, at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1 (2012) (directing that strip searches are prohibited
absent a warrant, probable cause, or consent); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:31-8.4–.7 (2012)
(listing rules regarding strip searches and body cavity searches).
63. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1.
64. Florence, No. 10-945, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012).
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
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simply be “unworkable.”68 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito,
and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, but Roberts, Alito, and
Thomas all voiced doubts, as well.69 Their votes were essential to
achieving a majority on the outcome, but they emphasized that while it may
be reasonable to apply the same search procedures to everyone in the
specific prisoner population and conditions present in this case, it might not
always be reasonable to do so.70 The ruling, they pointed out, did not
authorize jail officials to conduct a strip search unless the prisoner was to be
placed among other prisoners at the facility. Thus, on closer inspection, the
narrow 5–4 ruling in Florence was even more divided and will most likely
serve as a somewhat uncertain precedent for analogous cases in the future.
Meanwhile, the four dissenters unknowingly agreed with the American
public that it was altogether unreasonable to subject minor offenders to such
a “humiliating” search “unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion
to believe the individual possessed drugs or other contraband.”71
The Court split 5–4 along ideological lines, with the five “conservatives”
making the majority. A notable difference between public opinion and the
opinion of the Court, then, is that the former did not split ideologically. As
in Jones, the public’s judgment on the case cut across all demographics.
Two-thirds of both Democrats and Republicans were against automatic strip
searches.72 Likewise, self-identified conservatives, moderates, and liberals
were in agreement.73
C. Cooper and Frye: Popular Constitutionalism and the Right to Counsel
in Plea Bargaining
While Jones and Florence dealt with procedural matters involving law
enforcement, two other important cases from the 2011 Term involved
questions about the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel,” particularly as it
impacts the plea bargaining process. Criminal defendants have a right to
counsel, but whether that includes a right to good (i.e., strategically sound)
counsel was the core issue posed both to the public and to the Court.
In Cooper, respondent Anthony Cooper fired a gun at the victim’s head
and, despite missing, chased her while firing several rounds into her lower

68. Id. at 14.
69. The Chief Justice and Justice Alito each wrote separate concurring opinions. See id.
at 1 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring). Although they both joined
the opinion of the Court, Roberts and Alito each emphasized how narrow they thought the
decision actually was. Justice Thomas declined to join a portion of Kennedy’s reasoning.
See id. at 1 (majority opinion).
70. Id. at 1 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[I]t is important for me that the Court does not
foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announces.”); id. at 1 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court but emphasize the limits of today’s holding.”).
71. Id. at 2, 4 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 14, at 2.
73. Id.
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extremities.74 Cooper stood accused of assault with intent to murder,
among other things, and faced a potential sentence of 185–360 months’
imprisonment.75 Although the prosecutor had offered to dismiss two of the
charges against Cooper in exchange for a guilty plea—which would have
resulted in a maximum sentence of 51–85 months in prison—Cooper
followed his attorney’s advice to turn down the offer and hold out for a
better deal because, in the attorney’s view, the prosecution could not prove
Cooper’s intent to kill.76 After all, counsel reasoned, after the first bullet
missed the victim’s head, the bullets Cooper subsequently fired at her all
struck below the waist: one in the hip, one to the side of the abdomen, and
two to the buttocks.77 However, the prosecutor refused to offer a better deal
and went forward with the trial for intent to murder.78 Cooper was
subsequently convicted, and the judge sentenced him to the mandatory
minimum of 185–360 months in prison—three times the sentence he would
have received had he accepted the plea.79
Did this constitute ineffective assistance of counsel? There was no
question that the trial was fair, and counsel’s conduct at the trial was not in
dispute. Moreover, accepting a plea bargain would have limited and
waived some of Cooper’s rights including “all the constitutional protections
a trial entails.”80
In speaking to the public, we consolidated the history and relevant
information in Cooper to two sentences and offered two possible positions.
We asked our respondents whether the defendant had a right to good advice
from his lawyer, rendering the rejected plea-bargain “a case of unfair legal
procedure” entitled to a “do-over.”81 Alternatively, we allowed respondents
to agree with the proposition that “you can’t jam up the legal system with
re-trials just because lawyers sometimes give bad advice.”82
Faced with this choice, the public split closely: 44 percent said the case
should receive a do-over, but a statistically equivalent share, 42 percent,
said this was impractical.83 The remaining fourteen percent in this case
were undecided.84 Women, Democrats, and liberals—by five-to-four
ratios—tended to say that the defendant had a right to good advice and that
the procedure leading to his conviction was unfair.85 Men, independents,
and Republicans leaned the other way by similar margins.86
74. No. 10-209, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-209.pdf.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Cooper, No. 10-209, 2011 WL 1523284, at *3.
81. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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The most interesting divergence in this case, however, related to race.
Whites split fairly evenly, with 45 percent saying that lawyers sometimes
just give bad advice, while 41 percent said that an inadvisable, rejected plea
bargain should trigger a do-over.87 African Americans, on the other hand,
found by a nearly three-to-one margin that the scenario was unfair and that
a defendant has the right to good advice.88 We infer that different
experiences with, and perceptions of, the criminal justice system are
responsible for these divergent outcomes.
In early April 2012, months after our polling concluded, the Court
revealed its own divisions, ruling 5–4 that a defendant’s right to counsel
includes good advice even in the context of plea bargaining.89 However,
the Court ruled that a good deal of the burden in this context would fall on
the accused. Specifically, the accused must show that,
but for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is a reasonable probability
that the plea offer would have been presented to the court . . . that the
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence,
or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under
the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.90

In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for opening “a whole new field of
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”91 Scalia’s
dissent concluded that “the ordinary criminal process has become too long,
too expensive, and unpredictable, in no small part as a consequence of an
intricate federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed on the States by this
Court in pursuit of perfect justice.”92 These remarks seem to reflect the
sentiment expressed by much of the public that “you can’t jam up the legal
system with re-trials just because lawyers sometimes give bad advice.”93
Cooper was tied to another case involving a plea offer gone awry:
Frye.94 Here, the issue was not that the defense counsel offered bad advice
in connection with a plea offer but that he failed to inform his client that a
plea bargain was even available.95 In this case, respondent Frye was
charged with his fourth instance of driving with a revoked license and, as a
result, faced a maximum sentence of four years’ imprisonment.96 The
prosecutor offered defense counsel a choice of two plea bargains, each of
which would have resulted in a sentence of no more than ninety days in

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012).
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. at 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3.
94. No. 10-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf.
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id.
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prison.97 By the time the defendant became aware of the prosecutor’s
offers, however, both had expired and other events interceded, including
another arrest of Mr. Frye on the same offense.98 Frye eventually pled
guilty without the option of any plea bargain, and the court meted out a
three year sentence.99 Frye appealed, arguing that had he known about the
initial plea offer he would have accepted it and received a much lighter
penalty.100 Conversely, the state of Missouri argued, “[T]he accused has no
right to a plea bargain, and a plea bargain standing alone has no
constitutional significance.”101
We asked the public whether the defendant’s sentence should be
overturned because he never had the chance to consider a lesser sentence or
upheld because “the defendant doesn’t have a right to a plea bargain, only a
right to a fair trial.”102 In this test, the public and the Court matched up
more closely than in Cooper.
The majority of respondents (53%) said Frye’s sentence, which had been
imposed without his knowledge of the plea bargain option, should be
overturned.103 Meanwhile, only a third (34%) said that the defendant’s
rights were limited to a fair trial.104 Again, there was a pronounced
difference in the category of race. While white voters favored overturning
the sentence by 49 percent to 36 percent, black voters favored overturning it
by 67 percent to 22 percent.105
The Court’s 5–4 split very much mirrored public opinion with respect
both to the substance and the ratio of division. A majority of the Court
concluded that the “Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are
rejected.”106 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, observed that the
“simple reality” is that plea bargains have “become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met
to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”107
Justice Scalia, who read aloud his dissenting opinions in both Cooper and
Frye, called the rulings “inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment and
decades of our precedent.”108 Scalia maintained that each case should have
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Brief for Respondent, Frye, No. 10-444, 2011 WL 2837937.
101. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, Frye, No. 10-444, 2011 WL 2837937, at *9.
102. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas
joined in Scalia’s dissent.
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been resolved based on the fairness of the trial process, not the integrity of
the plea process by which a fair trial was waived.109 In Frye, he observed,
“it can be said not only that the process was fair, but that the defendant
acknowledged the correctness of his conviction.”110
The dissenting Justices conceded that the “plea-bargaining process is a
subject worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal
convictions are obtained.”111 Nevertheless, they also noted that this process
“happens not to be . . . a subject covered by the Sixth Amendment, which is
concerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the fairness of
conviction.”112
Not surprisingly, the Court’s split divided the four Justices appointed by
Democrats on one side and four Justices appointed by Republicans on the
other, with Justice Kennedy holding the deciding vote. Likewise, among
the public, approximately two thirds of liberals and Democrats were in
favor of overturning the defendant’s sentence, while Republicans and
conservatives were essentially split on the question.113
D. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC:
Popular Constitutionalism and a Ministerial Exception to
the First Amendment
Finally, we have the case of Hosanna-Tabor, which addresses limits on
religious organizations’ ability to hire and fire employees who double as
ministers, irrespective of federal laws that forbid various forms of
discrimination in employment decisions.114 In Hosanna-Tabor, the
congregation of a Redford, Michigan, church dismissed an employee on the
grounds that she was no longer “called.”115
Many of the church’s teachers, though not all, were classified as “called”
(i.e., considered to have been called to their vocation by God through the
church’s congregation).116 Once called, a teacher receives the title of
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”117 To be eligible for this title, a
candidate must complete courses in theological study, obtain the
endorsement of her local Synod district, and pass an oral examination given
by the faculty committee.118 Called teachers may serve for an open ended
term subject to rescission only for cause and only by a supermajority vote
of the congregation.119 In contrast, “lay” or “contract” teachers are not
109. Id. at 2–3.
110. Id. at 1.
111. Id. at 4–5.
112. Id.
113. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3.
114. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf.
115. No. 10-553, slip op. at 3.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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required to undergo any special training nor are they appointed by the
congregation and are only hired for renewable one-year terms.120
Cheryl Perich, who taught religion (among other subjects) to
kindergarteners and led prayer services, was among those teachers
considered called to her vocation.121 When she fell ill with narcolepsy
several years later, however, the congregation wished to release her from
called status.122 Perich, then cleared by her doctors to return to work,
refused the offer.123
The awkwardness that ensued prompted the congregation to rescind
Perich’s call.124 Meanwhile, Perich filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) asserting that the church
had retaliated against her for opposing its decision to change her status, a
decision she claimed was based on its erroneous conclusion that she was
too ill to carry out her duties and resentment that she challenged its wishes
at all.125
Setting theological and medical questions aside, the case amounted to the
following questions: Could the church dismiss Perich on the religious
grounds that she was no longer called? Or was being no longer called
simply a mask for discrimination?
In exploring the important legal questions in this case, we asked voters
whether “[in order] to protect religious freedom, churches have the right to
hire and fire employees for religious reasons without interference from
government rules,” or “[in order] to protect individual rights, churches have
to follow the same rules as government and business when it comes to
hiring and firing.”126 Once again, the public split quite evenly: 46 percent
sided with the church, supporting its unencumbered right to hire and fire,
and 43 percent sided with the teacher, a division that amounted to a
statistical tie.127 Only 10 percent of voters were unsure or had mixed
views.128
Behind these different views were clear partisan and ideological
differences. A majority of Democrats (56%) believed that an individual’s
rights must be protected, whereas a greater majority of Republicans (64%)
believed that government may not interfere with church hiring.129 Self
described liberals, by a similar five-to-three margin, believed that a church
must abide by existing employment laws, while a majority of conservatives

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Ministerial Exception Press Release, supra note 12, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(60%) agreed with the church’s argument and its prerogative to change the
vocational status of its employees to enable their termination.130
Whatever the differences among the public, the Court was not of two
minds in this dispute, ruling 9–0 in an opinion delivered by the Chief
Justice in January 2012, just weeks after our polling had concluded.131 The
Court held that church ministers, however they are defined, serve as an
exception to the antidiscrimination rules that govern other businesses,
nonprofits, and government agencies.132 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts observed that “[t]he interest of society in the enforcement of
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is
the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs,
teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”133 He concluded that
“[w]hen a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the
balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it
on its way.”134
Clearly, the public was not this unified, decisive, or forceful. It is
intriguing that the Justices were in strong agreement regarding this area of
First Amendment law, while the general public splintered on the competing
values of equal employment protection and religious accommodation.
III. POLL POSITION: TAKING STOCK OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE 2011 TERM
All five of the constitutional cases discussed in this essay concern
individual rights, as opposed to questions about the scope of government
powers or federalism. In all five, the public was barely aware of the case, if
they were familiar at all. Yet, in all five, the public had little trouble
identifying a preference for deciding the controversy.135 In several cases
from this term and our prior surveyed term—such as Brown v. Plata, a
prison overcrowding case from the 2010 Term,136 and Florence, the strip

130. Id.
131. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10-553, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012) (Thomas, J.,
concurring), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf. Justice
Alito also filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Kagan. See id. at 1 (Alito,
J., concurring).
132. Id. at 15–18 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 21.
134. Id. at 21–22.
135. These outcomes square with our results from last term. In our previous polling on
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011), for
example, 69 percent of voters indicated that they had never heard of the case or the
underlying controversy (a number that is probably underestimated), but 86 percent of these
respondents still offered an opinion about the case, while only 14 percent said they were
unsure or had mixed views on how to resolve the controversy. See Peabody & Woolley, Res
Publica, supra note 4, at 16.
136. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
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search case from this term—the public’s pronounced opinion was in stark
contrast with the ruling delivered by the Court.137
While our surveys cannot register the intensity of the public’s views, the
results underscore a point made frequently by scholars: the Court’s power
derives, in part, from its relative seclusion from the public eye. In this way,
high profile, widely discussed cases, such as National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, may be the exceptions that prove the rule.
This is to say that the Court is able, for the most part, to do its work away
from an immediate tumult of public opinion, the result being that public
attitudes toward the Court as an institution (so called “diffuse” support)
tend to remain positive even when Court opinions go against the wishes of a
majority of the public.
To reinforce this point—that public opinion need not mesh perfectly with
the Court’s individual decisions for the Court to enjoy a broad reputation
for legitimacy—we will take another look at how our five recent measures
of public opinion reconcile with the corresponding Court decisions. The
cases can be classified in several ways.
A. Agree To Disagree: Cases Where the Court or the Public Express
Strong Consensus or Disagreement
One approach is to compare cases where the margins of agreement or
disagreement, within either the Court or the public, were high. Of the five
cases, three resulted in 5–4 decisions by the Court: Florence, Cooper, and
Frye. Only in Cooper was public opinion also closely divided.138 In
Florence and Frye, however, the public had a decided preference. The
public’s twenty-point preference in Frye for the defendant accorded with
the Court’s 5–4 ruling.139 In contrast, the public’s thirty-point preference in
Florence for the defendant was in contrast to the Court’s 5–4 majority.140
The two other cases, Jones and Hosanna-Tabor, resulted in unanimous
decisions by the Court.141 In Hosanna-Tabor, public opinion was split
evenly, in stark contrast to the Court’s emphatic ruling for the church.142 In
Jones, however, the public’s fifty-point margin in favor of the defendant
was just as emphatic as the Court’s unanimous ruling, a perfect
alignment.143
In light of our limited sample, we are unable to conclude that when the
Court has a close ruling, the public’s opinion will be similarly divided. Nor

137. See Peabody & Woolley, Res Publica, supra note 4, at 18–19 for our commentary
on Brown.
138. See supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 94–113 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text.
141. Overall, 44 percent of the cases from the 2011 Term resulted in unanimous rulings,
an unusually high figure. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Moving Beyond Its Old Divides,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2012, at A1.
142. See supra notes 114–34 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 25–48 and accompanying text.
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can we say that when the Court rules with great consensus, public opinion
will be similarly unified. No pattern in this regard emerged in our cases
from this term or when combining these cases with those from the previous
term.
B. The Political Divide: Cases Where the Court or the Public Split on
Ideological Differences
Another way we can classify the cases is to identify those where clear
partisan divides emerged among the public or the Court. Importantly, if not
surprisingly, the cases decided by narrow margins—Florence, Cooper, and
Frye—reflected obvious partisan cleavages within the Court, with Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on one side and
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan on the other. In only two
of those three cases, however, did similar partisan divides emerge in the
public. In Cooper and Frye, both cases regarding criminal procedure,
Democrats differed significantly from Republicans, as did liberals from
conservatives.144 In Florence, however, public opinion did not reflect the
Court’s partisanship.145
Meanwhile, the Court’s unanimous opinions in Jones and HosannaTabor did not evidence partisan division. This result was consistent with
the public’s opinion of Jones, such that the Court and public were equally
emphatic that the police’s use of GPS technology to monitor the defendant
for an extended period constituted an unreasonable search for which a valid
warrant was required.146 In Hosanna-Tabor, however, the public broke
with the Court and voiced strong partisan differences, with Democrats
favoring the same statutory rules for church employers and Republicans
favoring limits on government interference with religious institutions.147
Consequently, we cannot say that the Court’s partisanship reflects the
public’s partisanship or vice versa.
C. The Ties That Bind: Cases Where the Court and Public Agree
A third way to classify the cases is to identify those where the Court’s
majority and the public majority were in agreement. In Cooper and
Hosanna-Tabor, however, public opinion was evenly split, so one could
reasonably object that it is too tenuous to say that the Court’s decision
contradicted public opinion. Alternatively, one could say that the Court’s
close vote in Cooper reflects the public’s divided opinion.148 In HosannaTabor, however, where the public also split evenly, the Court’s unanimity
was, in some sense, at odds with the divided public.149
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra notes 74–113 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74–93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–34 and accompanying text.
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In Frye and Jones, both the public and the Court were in agreement. The
public’s twenty-point margin in Frye was more decisive, however, than the
Court’s 5–4 majority.150 In Jones, the public’s emphatic preference
matched that of the Court.151
Only in one case can we say that the public’s preference was clearly at
odds with the Court’s ruling. In Florence, the public disapproved of prison
officials’ broad authority to conduct strip searches regardless of the
inmate’s crime.152 In contrast, the Court upheld the procedures of the
prison’s administrators, albeit by a small margin.153
In summary, we cannot conclude that the Court and the public were
generally in accord or disagreement. We can only say that the Court’s
rulings did not fly in the face of public opinion generally, with the
exception of Florence.
D. Implications of Our Findings
Although many scholars have concluded that the opinions of the Court
and public are often aligned,154 we are offering a more cautious view. We
suspect that this common viewpoint reflects some substantial accord
between the public and the Court in the most salient cases, but this, of
course, only reflects a fraction of the Court’s docket. Our study invites a
wider review of the circumstances in which the Court and the public act
together, a review that can now be bolstered with greater evidence from
cases and controversies of a lower profile.
In light of our findings, we believe that the most egregious anomalies—
Hosanna-Tabor and Florence, the cases for which the gap between the
Court and public opinion seemed widest—deserve a closer look.
In Hosanna–Tabor, it was not that public preference clearly went against
the decision of the Court.155 In fact, public preference split fairly evenly
(46% to 43%). What strikes us, however, was that the Court emphatically
interpreted the First Amendment to create a new, bright line rule that
protects the autonomy of religious organizations. At least three factors may
help to explain the apparent discrepancy between the public and the Court
in this case.
First, the Court’s opinion emphasized the lengthy history of recognizing
religious organizations’ discretion to control themselves internally,
including employment decisions. The weight of this history along with the
150. See supra notes 94–113 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 25–48 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text.
154. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford
Levinson ed., 5th ed. 2010); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT
(1999); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA (2006); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
155. See supra notes 114–34 and accompanying text.
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Court’s frequent acceptance of such practices provides a degree of legal
“path dependency” that would otherwise be absent for the overwhelming
number of voters who may consider the case without this background. A
second and related point is to note the concerted, strategic, and often
successful efforts of conservative interest groups to litigate cases regarding
the free exercise of religion.156 This context is also unique to the Court and
is also one that is certainly beyond almost every voter.
Finally, whatever force these factors may have had in driving the Court
to its decision, they were reinforced by the “functional” emphasis adopted
in the case. As Justices Alito and Kagan noted in their concurrence, in
determining whether an individual was properly regarded as a “minister”
performing religious functions (and thereby an agent falling under the
“ministerial exception” to the First Amendment), courts should analyze “the
function performed by persons who work for religious bodies.”157 But such
an orientation would only underscore the justice’s inclination to defer to
religious organizations instead of involving the Justices in the exhaustive
(and exhausting) task of judging whether a person performed identifiable
religious activities.
The other case that deserves a closer look is Florence, involving the
prison strip search.158 While the public opposed the searches the Court
ultimately sanctioned—indeed, by a wide margin (63% to 31%)—the
Justices’ decision was a narrow 5–4 ruling. Interestingly, public preference
showed no partisan divergence, though the Court did. Democrats,
Republicans, liberals, and conservatives all heavily favored Florence.
Coincidentally, Florence was also the only case of the five in which the
Court’s majority deferred to the administrative expertise of the correctional
system’s bureaucracy as a basis for their decision, not doubting how prison
officials could most effectively accomplish their job. In other words, the
Court may have conceded Florence’s objections to the strip search but
deferred to administrative demands anyway. Moreover, the Court’s
decision could easily have gone the other way but for the concurring
Justices’ emphasis on the limited application of the Court’s decision. In
other words, the Court’s split decision—and its apparent tension with public
opinion—is less dramatic than first meets the eye.
The cases tested over this term and the 2010 Term posed questions
relating to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. In this regard,
we note that three of the First Amendment cases (involving free speech and
religion) brought out larger differences between the Court and public
opinion than other cases.

156. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT (2007).
157. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10-553, slip op.
at 2 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012) (Alito, J., concurring), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf.
158. See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text.
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The Court’s unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor ran contrary to the
public’s split decision on the case, and the Court’s unanimity stood in
contrast to the public’s partisanship. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association,159 a case from the 2010 Term, the public decisively favored
allowing the state of California to regulate minors’ access to violent video
games, but the Court, in a 7–2 decision, protected the speech of game
makers and game sellers.160 In addition, the public broadly supported
school choice in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn161
even if the school had religious affiliations, while the Court’s majority
avoided this issue by reaching a narrow ruling on the grounds that the
petitioners lacked standing on this question of tax policy.162
In light of these results, we would posit that discoverable patterns in
public opinion and Court rulings diverge by subject matter. In other words,
any broad statements about correlations between public opinion and Court
rulings may need to distinguish among various constitutional provisions and
the specific values, powers, and liberties at issue.
IV. EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT AND PUBLIC
OPINION: ADVANCING HYPOTHESES
Five cases from the 2011 Term are not enough to establish clear, much
less predictable, patterns or relationships between the public’s constitutional
thinking and the Court’s resolution of constitutional cases. Even combined
with four polled cases from the 2010 Term, one can only offer the most
tentative of hypotheses—speculation based on some of our more intriguing
results, and a set of conjectures that certainly require more systematic
testing.
One hypothesis we are ready to advance is that when there are sharp
partisan preferences among the public, these are likely to show up on the
Court as well. That is not to say that the opinion of the Court will reflect
the preference of the public, but only that when public opinion seems to
have a sharply partisan bite, we would expect a similar split to occur on the
Court.
We speculate that this relationship is somewhat one-sided: in other
words, when the Court’s vote and opinion presents an apparently partisan or
ideological divide, we do not necessarily anticipate public opinion will
reflect the same division. In Jones, for example, public opinion exhibited
little partisanship, in strong contrast with the Court’s opinion.

159. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
160. See Press Release, Farleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, U.S. Public Says
Regulate Violent Video Games, the Focus of Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 1 (June 6,
2011), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/vmerchants/.
161. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
162. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Public Blesses Arizona
Christian School Tuition 1 (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/
taxcredits/.
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It should be noted again that none of these polled cases were discussed
widely in popular media or by political leaders at any level. Voters were
simply unaware of these cases and received no cues, direct or indirect, from
political or opinion leaders of any kind. Therefore, we might initially
explain our observations about partisanship by noting the public’s lower
degree of ideological identification and orientation than elites. If ordinary
voters, who tend not to think consistently in ideological and partisan
terms,163 show evidence of this behavior for particular cases, it may be
telling and would help us to identify an issue, case, or controversy that
kindles such division. Where voters show an ideological orientation, then,
we think they are likely to serve as proverbial canaries in a coalmine,
presaging a similar divide amongst judicial elites who are more likely to
think (and are generally more capable of thinking) in ideological terms.
Obviously, this is a testable claim, which we look to confirm, disconfirm, or
qualify in future research.
A second hypothesis we offer is that, absent a threat to national security
or public safety, the public generally favors an expansion of individual
rights, especially when they can identify with the individual whose rights
are in question. Just as people favor tax cuts for themselves and oppose tax
increases on themselves—and just as they are generally willing to favor tax
increases on others but not tax cuts for others—citizens typically prefer
more rights rather than fewer when they can identify and sympathize with
the specific identity and qualities of the rights bearer. This observation
does not preclude disagreement or split decisions in the electorate, as the
public may differ as to which constitutional value choice best expands
rights, or they may simply not sympathize or affiliate with the particular
group or class of individuals at issue in the controversy.
This nascent theory of “egocentric rights expansion” is corroborated by a
number of our observations from the 2010 and 2011 Terms—including the
public’s simultaneous unwillingness to extend constitutional protections to
prisoners in crowded confinement (last term’s Brown v. Plata) but their
sympathy for incoming prisoners arrested for minor offenses (Florence).
We think more individuals can picture themselves humiliated in the context
of a strip search occasioned by a minor offense than amongst a crowded
cohort of inmates who need to be released. (Indeed, in such a scenario,
their identification is more likely to be with the members of the community
suddenly faced with an influx of released prisoners.)164 Arguably, some of
163. See Kathleen Knight, Ideology in the 1980 Election: Ideological Sophistication
Does Matter, 47 J. OF POL. 828 (1985) (providing evidence to show that under most
conditions “ideological thinking” does not impact voter behavior).
164. Our results in these two cases may also stem from our language choices.
Respondents in Plata were asked about releasing “criminals,” but those asked about
Florence were asked to make a decision about the legal rights of “person[s] admitted to jail.”
Compare Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, U.S. Voters Weigh in on
Brown v. Plata, Case Involving Prison Overcrowding 2 (May 23, 2011), available at
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/brownvplata/, with Strip Searches Press Release, supra note
14, at 2.
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this effect can also be found in our results on race and the legal counsel
cases.
African Americans’ higher rates of detention, arrest, and
incarceration and greater levels of distrust toward the American criminal
justice system may account for some of their greater willingness to insist on
good legal advice in plea bargaining.
This identification thesis also helps to explain why the results in several
of these cases, such as Jones and Florence, cut across ideological lines.
Someone who personally identifies with a defendant may set aside other
cognitive frames, such as ideology.165 Our egocentric rights hypothesis
also implies that the public will be more likely to support rights earlier in
the criminal justice process, when they can identify with defendants as
those merely accused of a crime, as opposed to convicted criminals.
CONCLUSION
Our polling on issues coming before the Supreme Court was driven by
two broad objectives. First, we wished to measure public opinion on cases
pending before the high court until patterns or relationships of one kind or
another can be discerned or until we can conclude that there is no
discernible relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court
decisions. It is a journey of exploration, worthy of undertaking, because the
existence and nature of the link between public opinion and government
policy is at least as important to defining our democracy as the Court’s
judgments.
A second, related goal was to become more adept, accurate, and
systematic in describing and analyzing the specific contours and content of
popular constitutional thinking, understood as the public’s capacity for
articulating its own judgments and voice on constitutional disputes and
problems. Setting aside the question of how (and whether) the public’s
judgments shape, or are shaped by, the Court, we found it important to
obtain a better measure of how ordinary voters approach constitutional
questions. The work captured in the preceding pages will help chart trends
and changes in popular constitutionalism and obtain evidence for evaluating
whether the public’s understanding of constitutional values and the
application of those values is a basis for optimism or concern when it comes
to diagnosing our civic literacy and political health.
With two Supreme Court terms and ten cases now comprising our set of
topics and issues, we have taken modest steps in the direction of addressing
both of these important inquiries. We are more confident than ever that the
traditional standards used for evaluating the public’s constitutional
165. For example, in our polling on Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011), a case
from the 2010 Term, voters identified more strongly with the need or desire of parents to
protect children from invasive interviewing of children than with the need or desire of
government agents to perform their duties in protecting those children. See Press Release,
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, U.S. Public Rejects Interrogation of Minors
Without Parental Knowledge—Even When Domestic Abuse Is Suspected 1 (May 26, 2011),
available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/4thamend/.
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competence—that is, measuring their knowledge of discrete facts about the
Court or its case law—are not only deceptive but also beside the point. In
contrast, polling on pending constitutional questions is an important part of
a more sympathetic approach to assess the quality and depth of the public’s
understanding of our constitutional law.

